FDI, Market Structure and R&D Investments in China by Lundin, Nannan et al.
 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 55665 

















IFN Working Paper No. 708, 2007 
 
 
FDI, Market Structure and R&D Investments  
in China  
Nannan Lundin, Fredrik Sjöholm, Ping He and 
Jinchang Qian 
 
 FDI, Market Structure and R&D Investments in China
*    
 
Nannan Lundin  
Research Institute of Industrial Economics and Örebro University 




Research Institute of Industrial Economics and Örebro University 
P.O. Box 55665, SE-10215 Stockholm, Sweden 
fredrik.sjoholm@ifn.se 
Ping He  
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Jinchang Qian  




FDI can be an important channel for developing countries’ ability to get access to new 
technology. The impact of FDI on domestically-owned firms’ technology development is 
less examined but it is frequently argued that technology externalities or demonstration 
effects could have a positive impact. Another and so far little examined effect of FDI on 
technology development in domestically-owned firms is through the impact on 
competition. We examine the effect of FDI on competition in the Chinese manufacturing 
sector and the effect of competition on firms’ R&D. Our analysis is conducted on a large 
dataset including all Chinese large and medium sized firms over the period 1998-2004. 
Our results show that FDI increases competition but there are no strong indications of 
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Research and Development (R&D) expenditures in China have increased rapidly in 
recent years. R&D as a share of GDP has more than doubled from 0.6% in 1995 to 
around 1.3% in 2005 and is expected to reach 2.5% or more in 2020. Most R&D is 
conducted in the industry sector (MOST, 2006), which is also a major recipient of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). China is one of the world’s largest recipients of FDI 
which has substantially contributed to production and export. Moreover, FDI to China is 
according to some reports undergoing a structural change away from simple 
manufacturing towards more technology intensive activities. For instance, China has 
become the third most important offshore R&D location for multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) according to a survey by UNCTAD (2005).  
Despite the increase in FDI and R&D, there is a concern in China that inflows of 
FDI do not contribute to technology development to the same extent as they contribute to 
production and exports. For instance, it is noted by policy makers and academics alike 
that while foreign firms account for a large share of export and production, their share of 
R&D is small. The recent emphasis on “indigenous innovation” and “indigenous capacity 
building” in the Chinese science and technology policy partly reflects an uncertain and 
even sceptical attitude towards FDI (MOST, 2006).  
However, the discussion on FDI and R&D in China neglects how indigenous 
technology development is affected by FDI. Such an effect could arise if, for instance, 
domestic firms learn from foreign-owned firms. FDI might also affect the competitive 
pressure in the market which, in turn, could affect the amount of technology development 
in domestically-owned firms. Once more, there has been a large focus on the (direct)  3
effect of FDI on technology development in the ongoing debate, whereas the indirect 
effect of FDI on technology development in domestically-owned firms has not been 
discussed or examined to the same extent.  
It is important to note that the expected impact of FDI on the R&D of 
domestically-owned firms is not clear. First, and as previously mentioned, there could be 
a demonstration effect or technology externalities from FDI that might increase R&D in 
domestic firms. This effect is typically attributed to a spillover effect from foreign to 
domestic firms. However, there could also be an effect of FDI on R&D in domestic firms 
through the impact of FDI on the market structure. The direction of this effect is more 
uncertain since it depends both on how FDI affects market structure and how market 
structure affects R&D. Starting with FDI and market structure, foreign firms might 
increase the degree of competition in the local market but it could also happen that 
successful foreign firms force local firms to exit the market with a resulting increased 
industry concentration. Moreover, increased competition could both increase R&D, by 
firms struggling to compete, or decrease R&D because of diminishing monopoly rents. 
The relationships between FDI, market structure and R&D investment have not 
been examined in a Chinese context, if at all. There are, however, studies related to the 
issue at hand. For instance, Girma et al. (2006) examine R&D in Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and find relatively high R&D in firms with foreign capital 
participation. The effect of FDI on innovations in purely domestically-owed SOEs is 
ambiguous. Moreover, Jefferson et al. (2006) find a positive correlation between high 
industry concentration and R&D intensities in Chinese manufacturing.  4
We contribute to the literature by examining the effect of FDI on market structure 
and how market structure, in turn, affects investments in R&D. Our analysis is based on 
firm-level data containing detailed information on operational and R&D activities of all 
large- and medium-sized Chinese manufacturing firms for the period 1998-2004. Our 
results suggest that FDI tends to increase competition, as measured by price cost margins, 
but there is no visible effect of competition on R&D intensities in Chinese firms. 
   The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set up a conceptual framework 
for our empirical analysis and briefly review previous studies in the field of interest. We 
give a detailed description of the dataset, classifications and some descriptive statistics in 
section 3, and continue with our econometric models in section 4. Finally, the results are 
presented in section 5 and we conclude the paper in section 6.            
 
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS STUDIES  
The conceptual framework is based on two strands of literature: the effect of FDI on the 
host country’s market structure and the effect of market structure on firms’ investment in 
R&D. Starting with the former aspect, the presence of foreign MNEs may exert a 
significant influence on the host country’s market structure. However, different 
theoretical models and previous empirical evidence show the relationship between FDI 
and market structure to be highly complex.
1 In other words, FDI can both increase and 
decrease the degree of competition depending on the specific context.  
On the one hand, FDI may increase the number of firms in an industry and 
thereby decrease the concentration and increase the competition in the market, in 
particular in industries with high start-up costs and high barriers to entry (e.g. Barba 
                                                 
1 See e.g. UNCTAD (1997) and OECD (2002) for more detailed reviews.  5
Navaretti and Venables, 2004, p. 174). This is true for greenfield investments but not for 
mergers and acquisitions and the former type therefore has a more competitive effect on 
the local economy (Haller, 2004). Moreover, the entrance of foreign MNEs might have a 
positive effect on production in existing domestic firms through spillovers and even 
increase the number of firms if employees in MNEs leave to set up their own businesses 
(Caves, 1996). This would also tend to increase competition. 
On the other hand, FDI may raise the level of concentration in the host-country 
market (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Foreign MNEs possess competitive firm-specific 
assets and might therefore be able to capture a leading market position. The number of 
firms in an industry might then fall after the entry of foreign MNEs, if only the most 
efficient firms can survive and the less efficient (domestic) firms are forced to exit.  As a 
consequence, the industry will become more concentrated. It is important to note that in 
this case, high concentration is associated with initial high intensity of competition. Once 
firms are forced out of the market, competition will tend to decline.    
Continuing with the impact of market structure on innovation, this issue has been 
addressed in a large body of theoretical work, which often yields conflicting results (e.g. 
Aghion and Howitt 1992, and Aghion et al.  2002).  
Innovations are in the classic Schumpeterian view of creative destruction made by 
firms which earn no rents if they fail to innovate and which obtain monopolistic power if 
they succeed. The market will be characterised by Arrow’s “replacement effect”, i.e. new 
firms replacing monopolists that fail to innovate (Arrow, 1962). However, when 
competition intensifies and, in turn, trims down monopoly rents, the incentive to innovate  6
will decrease. This theory therefore predicts a negative relationship between market 
competition and innovation.  
In contrast to the “replacement effect”, the “selection effect” of market 
competition predicts a positive relation between competition and innovation. Competition 
may stimulate innovation, when firms with innovation advantages further strengthen their 
innovation capabilities in order to escape competition with “neck-to-neck” rivals (see e.g. 
Vickers, 1997; Boone, 2000; and Aghion and Schankerman, 1999).  
In more recent theoretical work, the relationship between competition and 
innovation is described as non-monotone, which can happen when there are different 
types of innovators in terms of leaders and followers. Both the level of the technology 
gap and the degree of rivalry are important aspects that are taken into account in so-called 
step-by-step innovation models (see e.g. Aghion et al. (2001) and Boone (2001)). The 
step-by-step innovation models are of particular relevance for analysing “unlevelled“ 
industries, i.e. industries where different firms have different levels of innovation 
capacity. In such industries, there are technically laggard firms which have to catch up 
with the leading-edge technology before they can compete with their more technology 
advanced rivals. The ability to catch up partly depends on the level of competition. When 
competition is low, the leading firms will invest relatively little in R&D, which means 
that laggard firms have a higher potential of catching up and thereby a higher incentive to 
innovate. In the case of high market competition, the leading firms have a higher 
incentive to innovate to remain in their strong position. This makes it more difficult for 
followers to catch up and will, in turn, tend to decrease their incentives to innovate and 
they will instead try to find industrial niches with less competition from the leading firms.             7
As for the question of FDI and competition, economic theory gives us little 
guidance in making predictions on how competition affects R&D. There are reasons to 
expect that the effect can be positive as well as negative, and we have to address the issue 
by empirical analysis to obtain information on how the relationship works in a Chinese 
context.                
 
Previous studies  
Host country effects of FDI are subject to extensive empirical research, in particular in 
the field of technological development and spillovers.
2  Substantially less work has been 
done on the competitive effects of FDI. One exception is Co (2001) who found both 
positive and negative effects of FDI on competition in the U.S., depending on market 
conditions and the extent of spillovers. Chung (2001) also finds mixed effects of FDI on 
competition and suggests the degree of competitive pressure imposed by FDI to depend 
on both the entry mode and various investment traits.  
Studies on the impact of FDI on domestic innovations and R&D are also rare. 
Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990) study the Belgian manufacturing sector and find 
domestic firms to have lower innovation intensities, the higher the share of FDI in the 
industry. It is not examined if this result is caused by an effect of FDI on the market 
structure. 
Two studies on China by Jefferson et al. (2006) and Girma et al. (2006) are 
related to our work in various respects. Jefferson et al. (2006) use a similar measure on 
investments in R&D, the firm-level R&D to sales ratio, and find a negative relationship 
between firm size and R&D intensity, and a positive but fragile effect of high industry 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Lipsey (2004) for more detailed surveys.  8
concentration. Girma et al. (2006) find SOEs with foreign capital participation to have 
relatively high degrees of innovation activities. Innovations in SOEs without foreign 
capital participation can be both positively and negatively affected by FDI, depending on 
the absorptive capacity in these firms.                            
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Data 
Our data on large- and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises (LMEs) are compiled by 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and cover the period 1998-2004. The 
classification of LMEs follows the NBS’ classification from 2000. In this classification, 
employment, turnover and fixed capital are applied as a combined indicator of firm size 
(see Table A2 in the appendix).
3 NBS conducts a yearly census of LMEs and collects 
information on a large number of firm characteristics such as sales, employment, labour 
cost, material, fixed assets, export and ownership. The information on LMEs’ R&D 
activities includes R&D expenditures and the number of employees involved in science 
and technology. 
The industry classification is similar to the classification ISIC, REV. 3 and the 
included sectors at the 2-digit industry-level can be found in Table 2. In our econometric 
analysis, we construct industry-level variables, such as industry concentration and FDI 
penetration, at the 4-digit industry level in order to have industrial control variables that 
are as disaggregated as possible. 
                                                 
3 To compare market structure over time, we have re-classified the firms in 1998-1999 according to the 
new classification. This explains why the number of firms can differ from the officially published sources 
where the classification of firm size is not the same for the period prior to and after 2000. 
  9
Finally, the effect of FDI on competition and R&D might differ for firms with 
different kinds of ownership and therefore, we divide our dataset into domestic and 
foreign sub-samples according to the classification given in Table A3 in the appendix.                
 
Descriptive Statistics  
The share of foreign firms in Chinese manufacturing between 1998 and 2004 is seen in 
Table 1. Foreign firms include wholly foreign-owned firms and joint ventures between 
foreign and domestic firms. Foreign ownership has increased substantially in relative as 
well as absolute terms. For instance, the number of foreign-owned firms increased by 150 
percent over the period: from 3,489 in 1998 to 8,745 in 2004. This increase was higher 
than the increase in domestically-owned firms, as seen from the foreign share of LMEs 
that increased from about 22 percent to 36 percent. The other variables show a similar 
pattern of rapid increases, and foreign-owned firms account for about one third of 
employment, 40 percent of value added, and a staggering 76 percent of total exports. 
Table 1 about here 
Turning our attention to the focus of this paper, R&D, it is interesting to note that 
the foreign share is relatively small. More precisely, the foreign share of R&D 
expenditures was 21 percent in 1998 which, for instance, was larger than the foreign 
share of employment and about the same as the foreign share of LMEs. However, the 
foreign share of R&D has only increased to about 29 percent in 2004, which is lower than 
the foreign share of any other economic indicator in Table 1. One conclusion that can be 
drawn from the figures is that even if China is becoming increasingly attractive as a 
location of foreign firms’ R&D, as suggested by for instance UNCTAD (2005), this trend  10
is growing more slowly than the increase in foreign firms’ production, employment and 
exports. 
We continue by looking at the foreign share of different sectors in Table 2. The 
number of foreign firms is highest in electronic products (sectors 39-41) and textiles, 
clothes and shoes (17-19). In relative terms, FDI is of large importance in many 
industries but of particularly high importance in footwear, furniture, sport goods, 
computers and office machines, where more than two thirds of the value added come 
from foreign-owned firms. Once more, the foreign share of R&D expenditures tends to 
be lower than the shares of other economic indicators. For instance, the foreign share of 
R&D expenditures is 50 percent or above in only three sectors (leather and footwear; 
furniture; musical instruments and sport goods) and the foreign share of R&D is lower 
than the foreign share of value added in all but four industries (beverage; textiles; non-
metallic mineral products; non-ferrous metals). 
Table 2 about here 
The price cost margin is higher in foreign firms than in domestic firms in about 
two thirds of the industries. There seem to be important sector-specific effects in price 
cost margins, since foreign and domestic firms show a similar pattern across sectors. For 
instance, price cost margins are particularly high in food, beverage, petroleum, metals 
and machinery and low in cloths, footwear, wood products and some chemical industries. 
For domestic firms, the price cost margin is also relatively high in publishing and plastics 
and low in various machinery sectors. More importantly, there is no obvious relation 
between the share of foreign firms in a sector and the price cost margins in domestic 
firms: price cost margins are relatively high in some sectors with low foreign presence,  11
such as ferrous metals and petroleum products, but also high in some sectors with high 
foreign presence, such as plastics and computers. 
Finally, R&D intensities are generally relatively high in pharmaceuticals, 
machinery, transport equipment, electronics, computers, and office machinery but there is 
a large difference between foreign and domestic firms. R&D intensity is higher in foreign 
than in domestic firms in three sectors alone: non-metallic mineral products, ferrous 
metals, and non-ferrous metals. It is difficult to detect a direct relationship between price 
cost margin and R&D intensity. Domestic firms conduct relatively large shares of R&D 
in some sectors with high price cost margins, such as computers, and in some sectors 
with low price cost margins, such as machinery. Accordingly, there is no obvious relation 
in Table 2 between the share of FDI and the R&D intensity in domestic firms.  
 
4. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
The effect of FDI on market structure     
We use a two-step econometric approach. First, we investigate the impact of FDI on the 
market structure. We follow a standard approach and use the price cost margin (PCM)     











                                                 
4 Van Cayseele et al. (2005) apply an alternative methodology developed by Roeger (1995). The need to 
impose the constraint that mark-up (alternative expression of PCM) is the same for all firms within the 
same industry makes this methodology less suitable when firms are as heterogeneous as in China.   12
A high value on PCM means a large mark-up and presumably a low level of competition. 
Our measure on FDI penetration is calculated as the share of sales by foreign firms in 
total sales in the domestic market at the four-digit industry level. Exports by foreign firms 
are excluded from the sales figures, since such exports do not impose a competitive 
pressure in the Chinese market. The baseline econometric model is specified as:           
                 
jt r i t w n t i jt n t i jt gion D DIND DT OWNER H Firm FDI PCM ε λ λ λ ω ρ δ α + + + + + + + + = − − Re 3 2 1 , ,     (1)                                     
 
where  
jt PCM : The price cost margin of firm j, at time t.   
n t i FDI − , : The presence of FDI in industry i at time t at the 4-digit industry level, and 
where n is the number of lags. 
jt Firm : a vector of firm-level control variables such as capital intensity, market share, 
export intensity, and relative TFP.                          
n t i H − , : Herfindahl index in industry i as a proxy for industrial concentration at the 4-digit 
industry level.  
w DOWNER : a vector of ownership dummy variables.   
DT, DIND and DRegion are year dummy variables, industry dummy variables at the 4-
digit level, and region dummy variables at the 2-digit level (31 geographic units).  
 
In the above specification, FDI and the Herfindahl index are two industry-level 
variables that measure the effect of market structure on the PCM. The key hypothesis is  13
that high concentration raises market power and, hence, increases PCM. Moreover, FDI 
may have a negative or positive effect on competition.     
When examining the effect of competition on the PCM, it is also important to 
control for efficiency effects. A high PCM does not necessarily only reflect low 
competition in the market, but may also be associated with higher efficiency in the firm. 
To control for such efficiency effects, we include a firm’s TFP relative to  average TFP in 
the industry.  
Furthermore, a firm’s domestic market share and export intensity might also pick 
up the efficiency aspect. The market share may also capture the firm-specific market 
power. Following previous empirical studies by Scherer and Ross (1990) and Tybout and 
Roberts (1997), we specify a non-linear relationship between domestic market share and 
PCM and add a quadratic term of market share. The effect of export share on PCM 
depends on the relative price elasticity of demand for the firm’s product in the home 
market and abroad.  
 
The effect of competition and FDI on R&D intensity       
In the second step, we examine the effect of competition on R&D intensity at the firm 
level and estimate the following model:  
jt r i t w jt n t i n t j n t j jt gion D DIND DT DOWNER Firm FDI PCM RDINT RDINT ε λ λ λ ω δ α + + + + + + + + + = − − − Re 3 2 1 , , ,         (2) 
where  
jt RDINT : The R&D intensity, measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales of 
firm j, at time t.    14
jt Firm : a vector of firm-level control variables such as the share of S&T personnel in 
total employment, export share and firm size.  
 
An important methodological issue when estimating this type of model is the 
treatment of persistence in firms’ R&D investment behaviour. We include lagged R&D 
intensity to deal with this aspect, which means that we estimate a dynamic model. 
However, one econometric problem in estimating a dynamic model is that the OLS 
estimates are likely to suffer from a “dynamic panel bias”. Therefore, we follow standard 
approaches and, in addition to OLS, use system GMM estimates developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) which imply that RDINT and any other 
potentially endogenous variables are instrumented. The system first uses differenced and 
level versions of the estimating equation, where lagged values in the former  and lagged 
differences in the latter can serve as valid instruments. The differentiated transformed 
instruments are assumed to be uncorrelated with unobserved fixed-effects, implying that 
first differentiated variables can act as instruments for variables in levels, i.e. 
instrumenting levels with differences.  
We will use the Sargan/Hansen test to evaluate the instruments and the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term eit. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The effect of FDI on price cost margins 
We start by estimating the effect of FDI on the price cost margin in the whole sample of 
firms and the results are shown in Table 3. A number of different estimators are used:  15
OLS with and without industry and regional dummies and a fixed-effect estimator. It 
should be noted that the relatively short time period together with lagged dependent 
variables makes the fixed effect estimations relatively weak but including them will give 
us a sense of the robustness of the results. 
Table 3 about here 
Our first estimation shows that FDI has a negative impact on the price cost 
margin, but there is a time lag before the competition from FDI has an effect; lag 1 of 
FDI is statistically insignificant but lag 2 is significant. Excluding lag 1 of FDI did not 
change the results for lag 2 and including lag 2 of the Herfindahl index rather than lag 1 
did not change its significance (not shown). Moreover, the price cost margin is high in 
concentrated markets. The results seem stable across different estimations as seen in 
columns 2 and 3.  
Turning to our other included variables, it is seen that capital intensive firms with 
high levels of TFP have high price cost margins and that, surprisingly, firms with large 
market shares and export intensities have low price cost margins. Another interesting 
result is the significant and negative coefficients of ownership dummy variables in 
columns (2) and (4). It suggests that, as compared to the reference group of SOEs and 
collective firms, both domestic private firms and foreign-owned firms have low PCM. 
This can be due to both market-related and institutional effects. As an example, SOEs 
often obtain subsidies in terms of, for instance, access to capital below market interest 
rates, which might explain the relatively high price cost margins. 
   To examine the robustness of the results, and whether the effect of FDI on PCM 
depends on the degree of market concentration, we insert an interaction term of FDI and  16
the Herfindahl index. As shown in Columns (4)-(6), the negative effect of FDI on PCM 
remains robust and a significant interaction effect can only be observed in the fixed-effect 
estimation, where the competitive effect imposed by FDI seems to be weaker in 
industries with high concentration.  
Our main interest is to examine how FDI affects the competition for domestically-
owned firms. Therefore, we repeat the estimations above but exclude foreign-owned 
firms and joint-ventures. The results are shown in Table 4.
5  The estimations yield fairly 
similar results, but with two differences as compared to the full-sample estimations in 
Table 3. First, the negative effect of export intensities on the price cost margin 
disappears. This suggests that the negative effect found in Table 3 is caused by the 
foreign firms that are excluded in Table 4, and that those foreign firms therefore have a 
higher PCM when they sell to the Chinese market as compared to when they export. 
Second, domestic firms in concentrated industries do not have comparably high price cost 
margins. The results are, once more, robust to the inclusion of interaction variables as 
seen in columns 4-6 and to changes in the lag structure (not shown).  
Table 4  about here 
 
The proper definition of a market in a large country like China can be discussed. 
Our definition assumes the competitive effect of FDI to be the same throughout the 
country. This might be questionable and we did also construct FDI penetration variables 
as the foreign share of a region-industry; region being defined as east, west or central. 
                                                 
5 The estimations include SOEs, collective firms, and private firms. Shareholding firms and “other firms” 
are not clearly defined and can include foreign ownership and have therefore been excluded. As an 
additional robustness check, they were included in the domestic sub-sample but this had little impact on the 
results (not shown).           17
The overall results remained unchanged but the FDI coefficient  was slightly larger which 
suggests the competitive effect of FDI to be strongest within the same region.  
We did also experiment with alternative estimation methods. For instance, we 
tried to specify a dynamic model with lagged PCM as the independent variable. 
However, although the estimations confirmed previous results on PCM and R&D, the 
models did typically not pass the Sargan/Hansen specification tests and are therefore not 
shown.  
To sum up the results so far, it has been shown that FDI imposes a significant 
competitive pressure on Chinese firms. The result is robust to different estimators and 
various industry- and firm-level controls as well as in different subsamples. We now 
continue to examine if this increased competition has an effect on investments in R&D. 
 
The effect of price cost margins on R&D intensities 
The results from our OLS and GMM estimations are shown in Table 5. Most results are 
stable across different models and samples.  
Table 5 about here 
The results show no strong signs of an effect of competition (PCM) on R&D. For 
instance, PCM has a negative effect on R&D intensities in the OLS estimation on the 
whole sample, but the preferred GMM estimation shows a statistically insignificant 
effect. The same result with a negative effect in the OLS and an insignificant effect in the 
GMM is seen in the sample of non-high technology firms. The results in the sample with 
only domestically owed firms or only foreign firms show insignificant effects for both 
types of estimations.   18
The one possible exception to a non-significant effect of competition is in high-
tech industries where high competition (low PCM) might have a negative effect on 
R&D.
6 Note that this result is only significant in the GMM estimation and not in the 
OLS. 
We have also included an FDI variable which is expected to capture the effect of 
FDI on R&D after controlling for the indirect effect on competition. Such an effect could 
be through demonstration effects or technology spillovers. The results consistently show 
that no such effect seems to exist in Chinese manufacturing. 
The coefficients of the lagged R&D intensity are positive and highly significant, 
which shows persistence in R&D and justifies the inclusion of the lagged R&D intensity.
7 
We also observe a significant and positive effect of the skill-share but a significant and 
negative effect of firm size on R&D intensity.
8 These results are robust across the 
different specifications. Finally, private domestic and foreign firms seem to have lower 
R&D intensities than SOEs after controlling for various firm characteristics.  
As an alternative robust check, we estimated a fixed-effect model but the results 
did not change (not shown). Moreover, a relatively large proportion of the firms do not 
engage in R&D at all. It might be that such firms are located in small segments of 
industries where they are not affected by foreign firms or the industry level of 
competition to any considerable extent. We examined this issue by only including firms 
that have positive R&D expenditures in at least one year of their existence. Once more, 
                                                 
6 We follow OECD (2006) and define high-tech as including Pharmaceuticals; Air- and spacecraft; Radio, 
TV and communication equipment; Office, accounting and computing machinery; and Medical, precision 
and optical instruments. 
7 We have also estimated the model by including a two-year lag of R&D intensity. The coefficients on the 
second lag turned out to be insignificant and those on the first lag remained significant (not shown).   
8 Jefferson et al. (2006) find a similar effect of firm size on R&D intensity.   19
the results remained unchanged (not shown). Hence, we conclude by noting that the 
effect of firms’ price cost margins on R&D intensities seems to be insignificant and 
robust across samples and estimation methods.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
FDI can be an important channel for developing countries’ ability to get access to new 
technology. The impact of FDI on domestically-owned firms’ technology development is 
less examined, but it is frequently argued that technology externalities or a demonstration 
effect could have a positive impact. Another and so far little examined effect of FDI and 
technology development in domestically-owned firms is through the impact on 
competition. FDI might affect the degree of competition which, in turn, might affect 
efforts to upgrade technology in domestic firms. However, economic theory does not 
provide us with certain predictions on how FDI is expected to affect competition or how 
competition is expected to affect technology development. Some theories suggest 
positive effects while others claim negative effects. Hence, there are obvious needs for 
empirical studies but the existing literature is very limited.  
  It is also worth noting that the issue is of particular importance in a Chinese 
context. China is a major receiver of FDI but there are recent complaints that foreign 
MNEs do not contribute to Chinese technology development to any larger extent. Such 
complaints tend to focus on R&D conducted in MNEs and do not consider the impact of 
FDI on R&D in domestically-owned firms. 
  Our study starts by examining the impact of FDI on price cost margins in Chinese 
firms. We find a strong and robust negative effect of FDI on firms’ price cost margins  20
which suggests that FDI does increase the level of competition in Chinese manufacturing. 
We also find robust positive effects on price cost margins from high efficiency (TFP) and 
state ownership. 
  We continue the analysis by examining determinants of R&D with a special focus 
on the role of competition. The general conclusion is that we find a high degree of 
persistence in R&D and little evidence of any, negative or positive, effect of competition 
on R&D. Moreover, there is no indication of a spillover effect of FDI on R&D in 
domestic firms. Finally, firms with high R&D intensities tend to have a relatively skilled 
labour force, are relatively small in size, and SOEs are more R&D intensive than 
domestic and foreign private firms. 
  Relating our results to the ongoing policy debate in China, we do not find any 
positive impact of FDI on R&D in domestically-owned firms. Hence, it seems that 
although FDI has contributed substantially to Chinese production and exports and, as 
seen in the paper, to a competitive economic environment, it has not been an important 
force for promoting R&D investment in domestic firms, which is an important issue in 
China’s strive towards technological upgrading.  
  21
REFERENCE  
Aghion, Philippe, Bloom, Nichlas, Blundell, Richard, Griffith, Rachel, Peter, Howitt, 
2002. Competion and innovation: an inversed U relationship”. NBER working paper No. 
9269.NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Aghion, Philippe,  Harris, Christopher, Howitt, Peter, Vickers, John, 2001. Competition, 
imitation and growth with step-by-step innovation. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68 
(3), pp. 467–492. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Howitt, Peter, 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction. 
Econometrica, Vol. 60 (2), pp 323-351. 
      
Aghion, Philippe, Schankerman, Mark, 1999. Competition, entry and the social returns to 
infrastructure in transition economies. Economics of Transition, Vol. 7(1), pp. 79-104.  
 
Aitken, Brian J., Harrison, Ann E., 1999. Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp.605-
618. 
 
Arellano, Manuel, Bond, Stephen, 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: 
Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 58, pp. 277-97. 
 
Arellano, Manuel, Bover, Olympia 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable 
estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, pp. 29-51. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth, J., 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for 
inventions” in Nelsson Richard R. (Eds.), The Rate and Direction of Technological 
Change. Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
      
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, Venables, Anthony J., 2004. Multinational Firms in the World 
Economy, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 
Blundell, Richard, Bond, Stephen, 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in 
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, pp. 115-43. 
Boone, Jan, 2000. Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product and 
Process Innovation. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 31(3), pp. 549-569.  
Boone, Jan, 2001. Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19(5), pp. 705-726. 
 
Caves, Richard E., 1996. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  22
Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 2006. National Guidelines for 
Medium- and Long-term Plans for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) of 
China.  http://www.most.org.cn/eng/newsletters/2006/t20060213_28707.htm. MOST, 
Beijing. 
 
Chung, Wilbur, 2001. Mode, size, and location of foreign direct investments and industry 
mark-ups. Journal of Economic behaviour & organization, Vol. 45, pp. 185-211. 
 
Co, Catherine Y., 2001. Trade, foreign direct investment and industry performance. 
International Journal of Industry Organization, Vol. 19, pp.163-183.    
Girma, Sourafel, Gong, Yundan, Görg, Holger, 2006. Can you teach old dragons new 
tricks? FDI and innovation activity in Chinese State-owned enterprises. GEP Research 
Paper 2005/34, Nottingham.  
Görg, Holger, Greenaway, David, 2004. Much ado about nothing? Do domestic firms 
really benefit from foreign direct investment?. World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 
19(2), pp. 171-197. 
Haller, Stefanie, 2004. The Impact of Multinational Entry on Domestic Market Structure 
and R&D. mimeo, Department of Economics, European University Institute. 
Jefferson, Gary, H., Bai, Huamao, Guan, Xiaojing,  Yu, Xiaoyun, 2006. R and D 
performance in Chinese industry. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol. 
15, pp.345-366.      
Lipsey, Robert E., 2004. Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment. 
In: Baldwin, Robert E., Winters, L. Alan (Eds.), Challenges to globalization. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2002. Foreign 
Direct Investment for Development: maximising benefits, minimising costs. OECD, 
Paris.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2006. OECD 
Science, Technology and Industry Outlook. OECD, Paris. 
 
Roeger, W. (1995), “Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Difference between Primal 
and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimate for U.S. Manufacturing”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 103 (2), pp. 316-330.  
 
Scherer, Frederic M., Ross, David R., 1990. Industrial market structure and economic 
performance. Third edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 
  23
Tybout, James R., Roberts, Mark J., 1997. The Decision to Export in Colombia: An 
Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs. The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, 
pp. 545-564.  
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1997. World 
Investment Report, 1997: Transnational Corporations, market structure and competition 
policy. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), (2005), “World 
Investment Report, 2005: Transnational corporations and the internationalisation of 
R&D”, UNCTAD, Geneva.  
Van Cayseele, Patrick, Konings, Jozef, Warzynski, Frederic, 2005. The effects of 
privatisation and competitive pressure on firm's price-cost margins: Micro evidence from 
emerging economies. Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 87(1), pp. 124 - 134. 
Veugelers, Reinhilde, Vanden, Houte P., 1990. Domestic R&D in the presence of 
multinational enterprises. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 8(1), pp. 
1-15.  
Vickers, John, 1997. Regulation, Competition, and the Structure of Prices. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy. Vol. 13 (1), pp. 15-26.    
 
 
      24
 
Table 1. The number of foreign firms and the foreign share of Chinese manufacturing 1998-2004 





























1998 3489  0.22  0.26  0.21  0.58  0.14 
1999 3764  0.23  0.28  0.23  0.61  0.16 
2000 4221  0.25  0.30  0.20  0.63  0.18 
2001 4585  0.27  0.31  0.23  0.66  0.20 
2002 5327  0.29  0.33  0.23  0.68  0.23 
2003 6512  0.31  0.36  0.25  0.71  0.27 
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Table 2. Foreign firms, price cost margins, and R&D intensities, across 2-digit level industries in 2004 
   
Number of firms 
 
Share of foreign firms, 
% 
PCM 
  % 
R&D intensity, 
% 
    FDI  Domestic  VA R&D FDI  Domestic  FDI  Domestic 
13  Processing food from agriculture  252  654  38 8 11.3  15.4  0.09  0.22 
14  Production, processing of food  214  361  43 29 15.6  13.2  0.15  0.40 
15  Beverage  191  351  39 43 19.9  17.0  0.25  0.37 
17  Textiles  776  1673  28 32 10.6  8.1  0.32  0.36 
18  Wearing apparels  483  353  45 15 9.6  11.0  0.09  0.17 
19  Leather, footwear  376  158  67 50 9.4  11.4  0.11  0.23 
20  Wood, timber, bamboo products  79  123  33 11 9.0  14.5  0.21  0.37 
21  Manufacture of furniture  184  80  82 82 11.1  10.5  0.15  0.28 
22  Pulp and paper  180  432  43 38 12.3  11.5  0.23  0.26 
23  Publishing, print  110  185  46 37 17.7  16.2  0.21  0.21 
24  Musical instruments, sport goods  257  80  69 54 9.0  8.0  0.19  0.66 
25  Refined petroleum products  27  340  9 7  16.4  15.9  0.08  0.16 
26  Basic chemicals  221  1443  21 15 12.0  12.3  0.67  0.77 
27  Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemistry  158  593  23 22 14.8  10.9  1.44  1.34 
28  Manufacture of chemical fiber  58  165  31 18 8.1  8.5  0.21  0.63 
29  Rubber products  173  187  46 23 10.0  11.9  0.20  0.69 
30  Plastics products  454  268  55 28 11.6  14.5  0.27  0.59 
31  Non-metallic mineral products  322  1482  23 26 14.3  13.1  0.50  0.35 
32  Ferrous metals  114  813  11 4 15.7  12.4  0.41  0.24 
33  Non-ferrous metals  98  460  16 25 11.4  11.3  0.82  0.56 
34  Metal product  331  475  50 21 15.4  12.1  0.15  0.54 
35  Machinery, general  383  1265  34 24 14.1  8.2  0.67  1.29 
36  Machinery, special purpose  215  742  24 13 15.6  7.3  0.60  1.43 
37  Transport equipment  437  1231  46 32 13.1  8.0  0.70  1.30 
39  Electrical machinery & apparatus  795  965  43 23 11.0  10.8  0.47  1.17 
40  Computer, communication  1445  488  86 49 11.9  13.5  0.60  2.93 
41  Office machinery, measuring instrument  221  169  82 42 12.1  10.3  0.84  2.85 
42  Manufacture n. e. c  186  154  45 07 11.6  4.6  0.09  1.47 
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Table 3. Determinants of price-cost margins at the firm level 1998-2004. 
(Full sample, domestic and foreign firms) 
Variables  OLS (1)  OLS (2)  FE (3)  OLS (4)  OLS (5)  FE (6) 
           
FDI penetration  -0.002  -0.001  0.002  -0.000  -0.002  0.001 
(with 1 lag)  [0.016]   [0.009]    [0.008]    [0.022]   [0.011]    [0.010]  
           
FDI penetration  -0.027*  -0.031***  -0.023**  -0.037**  -0.038***  -0.032***
(with 2 lags)  [0.015]   [0.009]    [0.009]    [0.018]   [0.010]    [0.010]  
           
Herfindahl index 













           
FDI penetration X  Herfindahl index 
(with 1 lag) 






           
FDI penetration X  Herfindahl index 
(with 2 lags) 






           
Market Share  -0.192**  -0.275***  -0.111***  -0.192**  -0.276***  -0.110** 
  [0.067]  [0.047]  [0.038]  [0.064] [0.050] [0.038] 
           












           












           












           
Export intensity  -0.022***  -0.017***  -0.002  -0.022***  -0.017***  -0.002 
  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] 





- -  -1.051** 
[0.359] 
- 





- -  -0.880** 
[0.330] 
- 
           
Ownership dummy 
(JV foreign & Foreign ) 
- -1.691*** 
[0.418] 
- -  -1.689*** 
[0.418] 
- 
           
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  No  Yes  -  No  Yes  - 
Regional dummies   No  Yes   -  No  Yes  - 
0.33 
 














Observations  23123  23123  23123  23123 23123 23123 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. Standard errors in 
brackets are adjusted both for heteroskedasticity and potential dependency among firms in the same 
industry at the 4-digit level.    27
Table 4. Determinants of price-cost margins at the firm level 1998-2004 (Domestic firms) 
Variables  OLS (1)  OLS (2)  FE (3)  OLS (4)  OLS (5)  FE (6) 
           
FDI  penetration  -0.010  -0.017  -0.019  -0.004 -0.019 -0.024 
(with 1 lag)  [0.030]   [0.010]    [0.015]    [0.042]   [0.020]   [0.020]  
           
FDI  penetration  -0.037 -0.033** -0.013  -0.073**  -0.042**  -0.038* 
(with 2 lags)  [0.024]   [0.014]    [0.016]    [0.036]   [0.022]   [0.021]  
           
Herfindahl index 













           
FDI penetration X  Herfindahl index 
(with 1 lag) 






           
FDI penetration X  Herfindahl index 
(with 2 lags) 






           
Market share  -0.202**  -0.248***  -0.157**  -0.220**  -0.250***  -0.158** 
  [0.091]  [0.058]  [0.055]  [0.099] [0.059] [0.055] 
           












           












           












           
Export intensity  -0.014*  0.000  0.015  -0.014  0.000  0.015 
  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.015]  [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] 





-   -0.425 
[0.373] 
- 
           
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  No  Yes  -  No  Yes  - 
Regional dummies   No  Yes   -  No  Yes  - 
0.35 
 














Observations  12891  12891  12891  12891 12891 12891 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. Standard errors in 
brackets are adjusted both for heteroskedasticity and potential dependency among firms in the same 
industry at the 4-digit level.    28
Table 5. Determinants of R&D intensity at the firm level 1998-2004 
  All  firms   Domestic firms   FDI  firms   High-tech firms   Non-high-tech firms 
Variables  OLS GMM OLS GMM  OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS  GMM 
              
R&D intensity   0.198***  0.273***  0.316***  0.289***  0.098  0.204*** 0.346*** 0.387***  0.161** 0.225*** 
(with 1 lag )  [0.074]  [0.034]  [0.046] [0.039]  [0.064] [0.038] [0.048]  [0.064]  [0.074]  [0.033] 
              
PCM  -0.006*  0.003 -0.006 0.003  -0.007 0.003 0.006  0.027**  -0.009**  -0.004 
(with 1 lag )  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.012] [0.004]  [0.003] 
              
PCM X PCM   0.0001*  0.0000  0.0001  0.000  0.0001 0.000  0.000  -0.0004**  0.0002*  0.000 
(with 1 lag)  [0.00007]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.000]  [0.0001] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.0002]  [0.0001]  [0.000] 
              
FDI penetration   -0.0002  0.001  -0.001  -0.003 0.0004  0.001  0.003  -0.001  -0.001  0.002 
(with  1  lag)  [0.0008]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]  [0.0008]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001]  [0.001] 
              
Skill  share    0.091*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.069***  0.085*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.090*** 0.095***  0.062*** 
  [0.012] [0.011] [0.017] [0.013]  [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.019] [0.016]  [0.012] 
              
Export intensity  -0.0008*  0.0000  0.000  0.002  -0.002***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002  -0.0005  0.001 
  [0.0004]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.0006]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]  [0.0004]  [0.001] 
              






















































              
Ownership dummy 

















              
Year  dummies    Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry  dummies    No    Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes  No 
Regional  dummies    Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes  No 


















Observations  39687 39687 22942 22942  16745 16745  4986  4986  34701  34701   29
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Variable list and definitions 
Variable   Definition  
Firm level variables 
PCM  (Value added  – payroll) /Value added  
Market share   Sales by firm i /Total domestic sales of industry j at the 4-digit industry level     
Capital intensity   Log (capital stock / Total number of employees) 
Relative TFP  TFP for firm i /Average TFP in industry j at the 4-digit industry level 
Export intensity    Export/Total sales  
  
R&D intensity   R&D expenditure / Total sales  
Skill share     Number of S&T personnel/Total number of employees 
Firm size   Log (Real total sales)  
Industry-level variable 
FDI penetration   Sales by foreign firms/Total domestic sales at the 4-digit industry level   
Herfindahl index (H)  Sum of squared firm-level (domestic) market shares at the 4-digit industry 
level   
 
Total factor productivity calculation:   
ji Mi jt l ji Ki ji ji M L K Y TFP ln ln ln ln ln α α α − − − =  
 
where Y is real gross output, K is real capital, L  are number employees, and M is real material use. The α:s 
are shares of each factor in gross output, j denotes firms and i industries. We deflate output, capital and 
materials by the appropriate four-digit industry price deflator. Following Foster et. al. (1998) and Disney et. 












Employment (Person)  2000+  300-2000  300- 
Turnover (Million Yuan)  300+  30-300  30- 
Fixed assets (Million Yuan)  400+  40-400  40- 
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Table A3.  Ownership classifications  
 
Code Ownership 
Domestic ownership: SOE 
110  State-owned enterprises  
141  Stated-owned, jointly operated enterprises     
151  Wholly stated-owned enterprises    
  Domestic ownership: Collective 
120  Collective-owned enterprises    
130  Shareholding cooperatives  
142  Collective-owned, jointly operated enterprises     
  Domestic ownership: Private 
171  Private wholly owned enterprises    
172  Private-cooperative enterprises   
173  Private limited liability enterprises  
174  Private shareholding enterprises   
Foreign ownership: Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau invested 
210 Overseas  joint  ventures   
220  Overseas cooperatives    
230  Overseas wholly owned enterprises  
240   Overseas shareholding limited companies  
Foreign ownership: foreign invested joint ventures 
310  Foreign joint ventures  
320   Foreign cooperatives    
340  Foreign shareholding limited companies  
Foreign ownership: foreign invested  
330  Foreign wholly owned enterprises 
                  Source:  National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 